The Limits of Decentralization: Legislative Careers and Territorial Representation in Spain by Montero, Alfred
Carleton College 
Carleton Digital Commons 
Faculty Work Political Science 
2007 
The Limits of Decentralization: Legislative Careers and Territorial 
Representation in Spain 
Alfred Montero 
Carleton College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.carleton.edu/posc_faculty 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Montero, Alfred. 2007. "The Limits of Decentralization: Legislative Careers and Territorial Representation 
in Spain." West European Politics 30, (3): 573-594. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/
01402380701276428. Accessed via Faculty Work. Political Science. Carleton Digital Commons. 
https://digitalcommons.carleton.edu/posc_faculty/2 
The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380701276428 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science at Carleton Digital Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Work by an authorized administrator of Carleton Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact digitalcommons.group@carleton.edu. 
The Limits of Decentralisation:
Legislative Careers and Territorial
Representation in Spain
ALFRED P. MONTERO
Scholars of decentralisation in comparative perspective have argued that these reforms
should lead to a ‘territorialisation of politics’. For the party system and the legislature
this means that subnational interests will increasingly influence rules and practices as
well as positions on policy choice. This study tests this proposition in Spain, which has
undergone extensive decentralisation during its democratic history (1977–present). By
examining the career trajectories of deputies in the ruling lower house, the study finds
little evidence that decentralisation expanded the influence of subnational representa-
tives within the party system or the parliament of democratic Spain. This was true
despite the growing cohort of deputies with subnational experience in the Congreso, the
ability of subnational party offices to recruit and place candidates on electoral lists, and
the increasing importance of regional issues in national elections.
Scholars of decentralisation in Europe argue that the process creates a
‘territorialisation of politics’ in which subnational/regional identities reshape
the internal workings of parties and legislatures.1 Some predict that
decentralisation will cause organisational power within parties to shift from
national to subnational levels so that subnational actors (party leaders and
activists) will increasingly influence rules and practices as well as positions on
policy choice (Harmel 1981; Hopkin 2002; Maor 1998; Panebianco 1988).
Greater territorialisation of representation should cause parties to reconfi-
gure their internal rules, allowing for greater diversity of subnational
interests and experiences within the organisation (Tuschhoff 1999).2
Perhaps no European country is a better candidate to test the logic of
these arguments than democratic Spain (1977–present). During the 1970s,
the inauguration of a decentralised state known as the State of the
Autonomies coincided with the development of a democratic party system.
The nationalist regions of Catalonia and the Basque Country led the way in
Correspondence Address: amontero@carleton.edu
West European Politics,
Vol. 30, No. 3, 573 – 594, May 2007
ISSN 0140-2382 Print/1743-9655 Online ª 2007 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/01402380701276428
the creation of the federal system. These regions, and Galicia, enacted
Statutes of Autonomy (subnational constitutions) during the ill-fated
Spanish Republic (1930–36) only to have them abrogated at the beginning
of the dictatorship of Francisco Franco (1938–75). Catalonian and Basque
nationalist parties seized on the reinstatement of the autonomy statutes as
the basis for their claims to greater self-rule in the aftermath of the
centralising Franquist regime. As Spain’s 15 other regions petitioned for and
gained constitutional autonomy, subnational political forces emerged as
important actors in the building of the modern state-wide parties. Organised
as they were around socialist, centrist, and conservative poles, the state-wide
parties (re)emerged during the transition largely through the combination of
regional party offices and previously unaffiliated political groups with
localised bases of support. This was true of the Socialists (PSOE), the
centrist Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD),3 the Popular Party (PP;
formerly the Alianza Popular), and the former Communist United Left
(IU). These organisations joined the modern, nationalist parties – the
Catalan nationalist Convergencia i Unio´ (CiU), the Basque Nationalist
Party (PNV), the Galician National Bloc (BNG) and the Canary Island
Coalition (CC), among others, to form the contemporary Spanish party
system (Moreno 2002: 405; Pallare´s and Keating 2003).
The territorial dimension of representation became a major aspect of
Spanish democracy as it influenced the way parties operated internally and
the way that they formed coalitions to govern. All of the Spanish parties
maintained subnational offices that became important recruiters of
candidates for elected positions and for supporting campaign efforts during
regional, municipal and national contests. During most of the democratic
period, one of the two principal state-wide parties – the PSOE or PP – held
an absolute majority in the governing lower house (PSOE during the II–IV
terms, 1982–93, and PP during the VII term, 2000–04). But at times they
needed to form coalitions with the regional parties to retain a governing
majority in the Chamber of Deputies (also known as the Congreso).
Subnational interests in this way exerted unprecedented leverage in the
Congreso during the 1990s (PSOE during the 1993–96 period (fifth
legislature) and PP during the 1996–2000 period (the sixth legislature) with
CiU, PNV, and CC).4 The PSOE government during the most recent term,
2004–08 (the eighth legislature), enjoys a slim majority over the PP thanks
only to nationalist support. Therefore the territorialisation of representation
continued on two dimensions: as a vertical link between national parties and
their subnational offices and as a horizontal link between state-wide and
regionalist/nationalist parties.
The vertical dimension became more important as national party leaders
decentralised resources in response to demands by their subnational
affiliates or allied regional parties (Boix 1998). Where party brokers resisted
these pressures, as in the case of UCD leaders who embraced centralisation,
the organisation they served did not survive (Hopkin 1999: 145–9).
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These dynamics transformed the Spanish party system into an archetypal,
decentralised structure (Colomer 1998; Lancaster 1999).
Despite the salience of these decentralising forces, the present study finds
that this process failed to fundamentally change the political career
trajectories of Spanish politicians in the way that the territorialisation
literature predicts. Although the emergence of the national party system
during the democratic transition favoured the role of regional organisations,
this did not produce a party system in which regional interests held sway.
Nor did the substantial fiscal and administrative decentralisation of the state
during the subsequent 25-year period make subnational politicians
especially influential in either their national party offices or in the
parliament. Analysis of the career trajectories of subnational politicians in
democratic Spain shows that decentralisation created disincentives for these
individuals to pursue positions in national politics. Decentralisation created
two political classes – one national and one subnational – with little
circulation between the two levels. This process actually weakened sub-
national representation within the parties and the national legislature.
Our focus on career trajectories of national legislators is especially well
suited to testing the effects of decentralisation on intra-party dynamics.
Political career paths highlight where the pyramids of power are in any
political order, and they are particularly useful in complex, multi-level
polities (Montero and Samuels 2004: 23). Observers of the Spanish case have
made the point that the rules governing the parties and the legislature are
less reflective of the real power dynamics within representative institutions
than are the career patterns of politicians (Lo´pez Nieto 2000). The evolution
of the State of the Autonomies reshaped the ideological, interest, and
professional cleavages underlying the Spanish party and legislative systems.
Inquiry into how political institutions work can therefore best be served by
examining the motivations, career goals, and behaviour of members of the
Spanish political class.
It is in the Congreso, the governing lower house of the Cortes (the
Spanish parliament), that the myriad logics shaping the organisation of
parties – the motives to win elections and control policy decisions – are
formed and are played out (Delgado 2000; Santamarı´a 1994). Internal party
organisation determines legislative behaviour so that what happens in the
legislature says a great deal about how parties are organised, the extent to
which they are centralised, disciplined and institutionalised (Mainwaring
and Scully 1995). The Congreso’s membership reflects the internal dynamics
of the parties given the predominant role internal party struggles play in
determining the placement of candidates on electoral lists and, therefore,
who gets a seat in the Chamber of Deputies (Mora´n 1996). Specifically, this
study argues that the pattern of career trajectories of deputies in the
Congreso says much about the relative importance of experience in
subnational offices for determining who composes the leadership of the
assembly and who manages to survive multiple mandates. The longevity and
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importance of these ‘subnational representatives’ in the Congreso is a prime
indicator of the relative strength of the intergovernmental cleavage in the
party system.5
Political trajectories are long in Spain so they afford much data for
comparison. While all political experience could be expected to be short
during the first legislatures, surveys estimate that almost a quarter of all
deputies in the Congreso between 1982 and 1995 had several years of prior
political experience before gaining a seat in parliament and over 80 per cent
of those in 1996 identified themselves as professional politicians (Lo´pez
Nieto 2000: 20; Uriarte 2000: 114–16). As in other established democracies,
the ranks of those who live from politics in Spain have grown over the years.
The importance of having subnational elected experience is seen by many
observers of the Spanish case as the result of the increased professionalisa-
tion of politics and the territorialisation of the country’s party system. Some
scholars have argued that the data on legislative careers illustrate a clear
tendency of politicians building their careers by first gaining regional
experience and then using that background to secure a position on their
party’s national list (Mora´n 1996; Gangas 2000).
All of this has implications for the extent to which the party system
represents the growing importance of subnational interests. If politicians
with subnational experience are more likely to identify with the interests of
their region, then we might predict a growing degree of representation of the
regions’ interests in the Congreso and we might be able to explain which
politicians will become most important in the lower chamber by serving the
most terms, gaining the advantage of incumbency, and achieving positions
of parliamentary leadership on behalf of their parties (Lo´pez Nieto 2000).
The longer these deputies serve, the greater their influence will be.6 The
length of a deputy’s incumbency in the Congreso is a determinant of a
deputy’s informal ties and understanding of the parliamentary process
(Lo´pez Nieto et al. 2003: 19). Deputies who sit for a single term have less
access to the ‘kitchen’ of the Congreso where the details of legislation are
formed. Also, the greater their positions of importance by becoming party
spokespersons for particular pieces of legislation (ponentes) or serving on the
powerful rules committee, the greater their influence as representatives for
their region. Thus, assuming that deputies with the most experience at the
subnational level are the most motivated and the best placed to articulate
their region’s interests, the extent to which this cohort serves long terms and
holds leadership positions will confirm that decentralisation has reinforced
territorial representation in the party and legislative systems.
This study analyses the career trajectories of the subnational cohort in the
Congreso for the entire democratic period (1977–2004). The data
demonstrate that subnational representation in the Congreso is weak, that
service to the national party bureaucracy is a more important predictor of
parliamentary longevity and leadership than is representation of regional
interests. Ambitious politicians who have made a career in shaping their
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region’s interests do not tend either by the efforts of their regional party
offices or the national party to gain influence in the Congreso. Moreover, the
data show that service in subnational government operates as an
impediment to a political career at the national level. Contrary to the
expectations of those who claim that decentralisation deepens the territorial
cleavage in modern European parties, the evolution of the State of the
Autonomies has not altered party or legislative authority structures in
democratic Spain. The main implication of this for intergovernmental
relations is that the arena of the national parliament and its party
organisations will not be the place where the evolving politics of centre–
periphery conflicts will develop.7
The next section examines how intra-party dynamics should ‘normally’
shape career trajectories in the decentralised Spanish democracy. On the
face of it, the territorialisation of the Spanish state offers an array of
incentives and opportunities for party leaders to promote the careers of
regional notables. Such subnational representatives have space for exerting
the interests of their region in legislative politics. And national parties,
particularly those in government, face strong pressures for integrating these
perspectives especially when matters of public policy require the support of
particular geographic constituencies. Nevertheless, the subsequent section –
the quantitative analysis of deputies’ careers – demonstrates that these
pressures and incentives are muted in the Spanish case.
The Institutions of Intra-Party Dynamics in Spain
The relative centralisation of parties is a key factor in determining the
autonomy of subnational interests in the organisation (Maor 1998). The
existence of closed-list proportional representation rules in which party
leaders determine placement on the electoral list and voters must cast their
vote for a list and not for individual candidates, bolsters the discipline of
rank-and-file politicians (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997: 421–9). Internal
party rules and the institutions governing the legislative process also
determine to what extent national party brokers command the behaviour of
backbenchers. Where the range of action of individual deputies is
constrained by these norms, legislation and electoral strategy are more
likely to follow the preferences of the national partisan leadership.
The Spanish electoral, party and legislative systems contain all of these
characteristics. National party leaders have the final say over the
composition of closed electoral lists in multi-member districts. The rules
governing the legislative process leave little room for individual deputies to
articulate views independent from those held by their ‘parliamentary group’
(political party). All legislation, including amendments and committee
work, is shaped by the whips (portavoces) of the parties. Deputies daring to
stray from the party line on electoral or legislative matters can be routinely
punished according to the internal regulations of the parties (Field 2003).
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Short of losing their seats, they may lose their partisan affiliations and
therefore their capacity to have any effect on the legislative process or keep
their seats during the next electoral cycle.8
Yet the structure of the Spanish party system also has aspects that
broaden the range of views that may be represented within the partisan
hierarchy. Decentralised party offices based in regional capitals and even
more locally have an important say in the composition of the lists for the
Congreso. They are also the chief vehicles through which the national par-
ties, and particularly the state-wide parties (PSOE, PP, and IU), integrate
the interests of the regions and then articulate the organisation’s position on
questions of local importance. Decentralisation of the party system, then,
has increased the autonomy of subnational partisan offices in three key areas
in which this autonomy matters most: recruitment, agenda-setting for
electoral campaigns, and strategies of representation in policy-making.
Candidate Selection
Some scholars have argued that subnational party leaders exercise the most
influence in determining the composition of electoral lists at the regional
level in Spain (e.g. Morata 1992). In practice, the electoral committees of
the subnational offices select politicians according to a variety of criteria.
Not surprisingly, service to the party is the most important factor in getting
any single politician on a party’s list. A rough indicator of this is that the
average period of party affiliation most often exceeds the number of years a
deputy has held political posts (Uriarte 2000: 116). This is logical given that
in order to receive a viable placement on the electoral list or an alta (direct
placement in the Congreso to replace a retiring member during a legislative
session) aspiring deputies must stand out in their service to the party. It
might be argued that doing so is more costly when a politician holds a public
office simultaneously since that politician must divide his or her time
between activities on behalf of the party and responsibilities as an elected or
appointed official. Despite this, a large number of deputies have served in
subnational appointed or elected office (43.8 per cent from 1977 through to
2004). Forty-three per cent of all deputies have also served in official
capacities in their subnational party offices. Holding office in regional and
local government and holding a position in the subnational party are
positively and significantly correlated at the .001 level for both office-
holding and number of years working in either capacity (.188 and .321,
respectively). So there is no prima facie reason to believe that there is a zero-
sum relationship.
However, a more evident trade-off exists between holding subnational
office and working for the national party bureaucracy. The general
correlation is negative and insignificant, and if number of years in
subnational office is used, the negative correlation is significant (7.054,
p5 .05), demonstrating a trade-off.9 This finding has implications for the
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kind of party service that determines deputies’ career possibilities in the
Congreso. Subnational representatives are more likely to depend upon their
affiliations with their subnational party offices than the national party in
order to secure promotion in parliament.
Agenda-Setting
Do politicians whose political careers in the Congreso are promoted by their
subnational party offices articulate the interests of their regions? The few
polls of national deputies that have been done in recent years offer a mixed
picture of the salience of regional representation. Using survey data
gathered by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociolo´gicas (CIS), Delgado
(2000) and Martı´nez and Me´ndez (2000: 235) argue that deputies identify
first with the interests of the provincial electorate in which they were elected.
National representation and partisan interests are considered secondary.
Yet in a poll of 212 deputies done at approximately the same time as the CIS
study, Uriarte (2000) reports that only 3 per cent of the respondents thought
that representing their region was a major motivation driving their political
careers. Universalistic ideals such as ‘serving society’ and ‘generating social
change’ stand out in deputies’ motivations. Given that the poll data are so
inconclusive it is difficult to assess the motivations of deputies. There is
sufficient evidence, however, to conclude that at least some deputies identify
their representative functions with their region. It is also safe to assume that
those deputies with the most experience in subnational politics are most
likely to articulate the interests of their region.
Internal party rules and those of the Congreso offer individual deputies a
limited but still appreciable opportunities for representing subnational
interests, if they are so inclined. Several regional and national party officials
report that individual deputies with the strong support of their regional
party offices can have a tremendous say over particular pieces of legislation
or amendments that are of importance to their districts.10 This influence
most often manifests itself in the form of informal contacts and pressure
politics in ‘the kitchen’ of the Congreso, that is, in an extra-legislative
setting. Yet individual deputies may also ask formal questions during
committee sessions that can reflect their region’s interests.11 More aggressive
and rarer forms of subnational interest aggregation in the Congreso might
also occur. As a last recourse, individual deputies may threaten to leave their
parties or actually do so without losing their seats. Under Spanish
constitutional law, seats in all legislatures belong to individual deputies
and not to their parties (Esteban 1990). Yet how frequent or how effective
these threats have been in representing some crucial interest of a subnational
government is difficult to assess. In any case, acting on the threat removes
the deputy’s influence on his/her former party, and merely threatening will
probably lead to the deputy’s removal from the party’s electoral list in the
next cycle.
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Time and position are the two proximate factors that explain the extent to
which any deputy with extensive subnational experience and close ties to
their subnational party office will influence the content of the legislative or
electoral agenda. Members of the subnational cohort who hold multiple
terms and leadership positions are more likely to be heard on matters of
particular importance to them and their local bailiwicks.
Partisan Centre–Periphery Relations
The promotion of the careers of deputies with extensive subnational
experience may also be a priority of national party brokers, if these
legislators offer the party a particular advantage in an electorally important
region. Decentralisation creates incentives not only for subnational party
offices to articulate themselves as the defenders of their region’s primary
interests, it gives national party strategists incentives to listen to those
located in regions and electoral districts where the seats of rival parties are
vulnerable. Capo Giol (2000: 72–3) shows that certain electoral districts are
more important to the two centrist parties (PSOE and PP) than others in
gaining seats to form an absolute majority in the Congreso.12 Therefore, the
hierarchy of important regions for each party will not only be different but
will be based on mixed criteria. Generally, parties will be motivated to
reinforce the support of co-partisan regions but they will also wish to
expand their parliamentary positions by undercutting the electoral support
of regions currently supporting their rivals.
Does recruiting and elevating politicians with subnational experience play
an important part of the strategy of gaining the support of these high-
priority districts? Once again, time and position are important. If the
longevity and leadership position of deputies is a proximate factor in their
influence, are members of the subnational cohort from priority districts
more likely to have successful careers in the Congreso?
The Effects of Subnational Experience on Legislative Longevity
and Leadership
The growing availability of congressional archives and biographical data on
Spanish deputies’ careers makes possible a systematic analysis of the
professional political trajectories of all 1,597 members of the eight legislative
sessions beginning with the Constituent Assembly (1977–79) and continuing
through the seven subsequent legislatures until the 2000–04 congress.13
Furthermore, experience as a representative at either the national or
subnational levels of government occurs in discrete periods of time, making
sequencing easier to map out. Since January 1985, the Law of Incompa-
tibility prohibited parliamentarians from holding elected office at the sub-
national or national level concurrently with their positions in the Chamber
of Deputies or the Senate.14 Additionally, the major parties instituted their
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own incompatibility norms. Practical impediments too, such as the growing
complexity of political office on the national and subnational levels, make
combining responsibilities prohibitive (Delgado 2000).
While there are few studies on the sequencing of political careers in Spain,
studies based primarily on surveys of politicians consistently indicate that
most respondents begin their political lives in local government (e.g.
Delgado 2000; Lo´pez Nieto 2000: 14; Uriarte 2000). The current study
demonstrates that the actual number is below 50 per cent (43) for all
deputies (although it is above 50 per cent for the latter three legislatures).
The data, summarised in Table 1, also confirm that prior experience with
legislative positions is clearly more important for recommending a member
of the subnational cohort to the Congreso. Municipal councillors (45 per
cent) and regional deputies (39 per cent) compose a larger share of the
subnational cohort than regional chancellors15 (18 per cent) or mayors
(17 per cent). This finding agrees with Lo´pez Nieto (2000), who found in her
surveys of mayors a general reluctance to move on to a national legislative
career.
This last finding may be indicative of a general inhibition on the part of
former executives in subnational politics to move to the Congreso. The
tendency is most apparent for former presidents of the regions. Lo´pez Nieto
(2002: 72) notes in her study of the first four legislatures that 18 of the 42
regional presidents served in the Congreso prior to becoming subnational
executives (43 per cent). However, only five (or 12 per cent) went to the
Congreso after serving as regional presidents. This is the same number that
went to the much less powerful upper house, the Senate, after serving as
regional executives. It is reasonable to assume that having congressional
experience helps regional presidents lobby for their region’s concerns. Yet
parliamentary parties do not gain the benefit of the experience of these
regional presidents when they leave office.
Some scholars have argued that the circulation of elites in several
subnational positions prior to going to the Congreso can be thought to
reinforce subnational experience in this cohort (e.g. Lo´pez Nieto 2000: 22).
While this is logical, the current study finds that there is not much
circulation of subnational elites. Most of the 699 cases of deputies with
subnational experience held only one kind of office (mayors, town
councillors, regional legislators, regional chancellors (subnational minis-
tries), or other appointed/elected office). Not surprisingly, 79 per cent held
elected office while 31 per cent held appointed office.16
The depth of subnational experience, measured by the number of years in
appointed and/or elected office at the regional/local level is also substantial.
Fifty per cent were in office 1–4 years, 26 per cent 5–8 years, and 24 per cent
nine or more years. With time, it can be expected that more politicians with
subnational experience would make it to the Congreso. Table 1 confirms
that subnational experience increased with each legislature. Perhaps most
striking is the role of particular forms of subnational experience at the
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municipal level and not just in regional parliaments. Decentralisation
produced career avenues for municipal as well as regional politicians to
make their way to the Congreso.
Some scholars have argued that analysis of career trajectories in the upper
house, the Senate, is more indicative of subnational representation given
that this is constitutionally the ‘chamber of territorial representation’. Yet
the Senate’s relative weakness in composing legislation makes it an unlikely
focus for subnational party offices interested in promoting ‘their’ politicians.
The Senate functions as a second reviser of legislation, making technical
changes in laws, but it does not have any power to initiate or radically
change legislation without the consent of the Congreso. Furthermore, its
members are elected through a plurality system, which in comparison to the
closed-list PR system that governs the rest of the legislature in Spain,
favours the promotion of candidates that are easily recognisable to their
constituents (Mora´n 1989: 79). This may advantage individual politicians
who take on the mantle of ‘regional representatives’ but partisan discipline
helps to keep all 252 senators in line with the wishes of governing parties and
coalitions in the Congreso. Partisan discipline controls even the behaviour
of the 44 senators elected by the unicameral regional parliaments. More
important for our purposes, there is little evidence senators provide a
regional representation function linked to the life of the Congreso. Analysis
of senatorial careers shows that these politicians tend to be generally
inexperienced in parliamentary offices (Mora´n 1989: 78). The present study
finds that only 154 deputies (9.6 per cent) served in the Senate prior to
serving in the Congreso.17 And even if the Senate were the chamber of
territorial representation, the average senator with legislative experience
does not spend much time there. Over 97 per cent spent two terms or less
there as compared with 76 per cent for the same number of terms in the
Congreso.
Given that there is a substantial and growing cohort of deputies in the
Congreso with significant experience in subnational elected office, one might
expect this group to exert a noticeable influence on legislation and the
workings of their parties. That influence depends upon the length of
incumbency and the leadership position of deputies in the subnational
cohort. If decentralisation has fundamentally altered the structures of
partisan careers and subnational party offices have gained autonomy in
promoting ‘their’ politicians, then members of the subnational cohort
should hold positions of leadership and retain the advantages of
incumbency to a degree above what would be expected of politicians
without experience in subnational office.
Longevity
All studies of the Congreso have demonstrated that legislative careers
are short-lived (e.g. Gangas 2000; Lo´pez Nieto 2001; Mora´n 1989, 1996).
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This study confirms that 52.5 per cent of all deputies served only one term in
the Congreso; only about 13 per cent served four terms or more. Given that
17.5 per cent of all deputies also failed to complete their terms, we can
conclude that the extent of turnover in the Congreso is high. In the seventh
legislature, for example, 41 per cent of deputies were new to the lower house.
While their stay in the Congreso is on average short, political careers in
Spain are long. The long-standing culturalist view in Spain that adopting
‘politics as a profession’ is frowned upon is not verified by what people who
go into politics actually do. How then can we account for the generally short
careers of deputies in the single most powerful political forum in Spain?
The two most prominent, mutually-supporting reasons given by scholars
of the Congreso are that parliamentary life is unrewarding (i.e. low salaries
compared with the private sector, little office space, the overpowering nature
of party leadership) for ambitious politicians and the Law of Incompat-
ibility reduces career politicians’ access to patronage (e.g. Lo´pez Nieto 2001:
225; Mora´n 1989: 79–80). If these reasons are true, we should see much
circulation of ambitious career politicians through the Congreso on to more
promising political positions, and particularly executive ones given the high
job approval ratings reported by mayors and regional presidents.18
If political careers are long in Spain, and the extensive years of experience
in subnational elected and appointed office for a large proportion of
deputies suggests that they are, then two salient trajectories involving
parliamentary mandates should be evident: (1) politicians with extensive
subnational experience complete their careers with a stint in the Congreso or
(2) politicians pursuing careers pass through the Congreso and then return
to subnational office. Table 2 demonstrates that the second tendency is
particularly weak. Relatively few deputies take positions in subnational
appointed or elected office (11.8 per cent) once they leave the Congreso. The
data also show a declining trend in the percentages of deputies for each
legislative session that continue their political careers at the subnational
level. This is striking for terms III–VI as this was precisely the most active
period for the development of the State of the Autonomies. Decentralisa-
tion, then, promoted a movement of politicians from the subnational level
to the national level but not the reverse. The evidence suggests a
predominant ‘topping-off’ tendency. This has implications for how decen-
tralisation affects legislative careers. Observers of the State of the
Autonomies have speculated that the emergence of regional governments
TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF DEPUTIES CONTINUING CAREERS IN SUBNATIONAL
OFFICE, LC–VII
LC I II III IV V VI VIIa
17.5 18.1 13.8 11.0 9.3 7.6 4.2 1.1
aOnly includes deputies that left during their terms.
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would cause an increasing number of deputies to extend their political
careers by seeking office at the subnational level (e.g. Mora´n 1989: 78).
Since topping-off is a greater tendency than passing-through, and Senate
experience is negligible, the most experienced politicians in the Congreso
are members of the subnational cohort and these politicians, like those
without subnational experience, tend to end their political careers in
Madrid.
The topping-off tendency puts even greater weight on the relative
longevity of deputies in the Congreso. Since these politicians are unlikely to
extend their experience and influence beyond this body, if they represent
subnational interests, the regions, cities, and subnational party offices must
get the most out of these politicians while they serve in the Congreso. The
preference of subnational interests would be to extend the number of
legislative terms these politicians serve to maximise their own influence.
Leadership
Placing ‘their’ deputies in leadership positions in the parties and the
Congreso is central to any attempt by subnational interests to project their
preferences onto the legislative process. Longevity and leadership are
intertwined as those politicians who have the longest runs in the Congreso
also assume positions of leadership. They become the spokespersons or
whips for their parliamentary groups, they assume the job of ponente or the
spokesperson on legislative committees,19 and they serve as representatives
for their parties on the important rules committee of the chamber.
Previous analyses have conjectured a strong relationship between party
leadership, parliamentary leadership, and longevity (e.g. Mora´n 1989: 83)
and the present study confirms this strong correlation. Of the total number
of deputies, this study found 18.5 per cent held positions as ponente on
committees, served on the rules committee of the chamber, or held the
responsibility of party whip. Veterans of leadership positions tend to have
longer stints in the Congreso compared with those who do not have this
experience. In this study, committee membership (e.g. the position of vocal)
in itself was not counted as leadership, nor was any leadership role in the
party bureaucracy outside of parliament considered a position of legislative
leadership. Only deputies serving in parliamentary offices with responsibility
over the legislative process were considered leaders.
The Statistical Analysis
First we estimated the effects on longevity for all deputies (N¼ 1597) based
on key explanatory variables representing regional experience, local and
national party activity, and experience in the national bureaucracy of the
Spanish state. Using an ordinary least squares regression analysis we
constructed a model including two regional experience variables – a dummy
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for subnational experience and a scale variable for years of experience.
Additionally, we measured three variables for party activity (a dummy for
holding an executive position in the subnational party office, an interval
variable for the number of years the politician worked for the subnational
party, and a dummy for holding an executive position in the national party).
We also included dummy variables for holding a position in the national
bureaucracy and being a parliamentary leader.
The results reported in Table 3 demonstrate that regional experience is
not a predictor of longevity. This was the case even when we estimated using
variables for elected versus appointed office and particular kinds of office
(e.g. mayors, regional deputies, chancellors, town councillors, etc.). The
years of subnational experience variable is significant but the sign runs in
the wrong direction. This might be related to incompatibility norms and the
inclusion of the first legislatures in which subnational experience was
limited. We tested the model for the final three legislatures, which had the
highest levels of subnational experience, yet we found the same negative and
statistically significant relation. This was true for deputies who served for
the first time in the fifth and seventh legislatures and for those serving in
each of the final three legislatures. The correlation was insignificant for
deputies who served for the first time in the sixth legislature only and the
fifth and sixth and the sixth and seventh consecutively. This suggests that
temporal trade-offs may explain some of the inverse relationship between
subnational experience and longevity in the Congreso but some of the
results suggest that other factors are relevant.
TABLE 3
ESTIMATE OF LONGEVITY IN THE CONGRESO, LC–VII
Explanatory variable Model I Model II
Constant 1.362** 1.474**
(.050) (.051)
Regional experience .094 .093
(.092) (.097)
Years in regional office 7.039** 7.043**
(.011) (.011)
Executive position in regional party 7.316* 7.352**
(.096) (.100)
Years in service to local party .085** .091**
(.007) (.007)
Executive position in national party .603** .774**
(.068) (.070)
Prior position in state bureaucracy .283* .331**
(.084) (.088)
Parliamentary leader .953**
(.079)
Adjusted R2 .325 .257
N 1450 1450
All unstandardised coefficients in bold are significant: **p5 .001; *p5 .01 (two-tailed tests).
Standard errors in parentheses.
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The consistent significance of the leadership and partisan variables
underscore the role of service to the party apparatus at both the national
and subnational levels as a reasonably strong predictor of longevity.20 Yet
the type of service to the local party office does differentiate the subnational
cohort’s trajectory in the Congreso. Deputies who have more experience
working in a decision-making position in the subnational party office serve
fewer terms in parliament. By contrast, experience in holding an executive
position in the national party is more important than holding such a
position at the regional level. Given the fact that experience in the national
bureaucracy also proves important, deputies who desire long stints in the
Congreso should develop their reputations at the national level. While years
of experience working for the subnational party is also significant, this only
suggests that sustained party activism is a more important credential than
being a notable in the local party office or having elected or appointed office
prior to taking a seat in the Congreso.
We estimated a second model to isolate the role of partisan factors
independent of the leadership variable, which the first model confirmed is
strongly correlated with longevity. Its removal underscores the importance
of activism at the subnational level and proven leadership in the party at the
national level in determining longevity. These factors remained robust
predictors even when we ran models controlling for kind of affiliation,
namely to the state-wide (PP and PSOE) and nationalist parties (e.g. CiU,
PNV, PA, BNG, etc.). In short, career longevity in parliament is a function
of service to the national party rather than service to the region or being a
local party notable, even in the case of nationalist/regionalist parties.
One possible explanation for the shorter-lived parliamentary experience
of members of the subnational cohort is that this group associates its public
life more closely with directly serving constituents. The decisions of these
politicians at the local and regional levels are more easily linked to specific
social demands and communities. Mayors, regional deputies, and town
councillors are also more accustomed to having greater influence over the
legislative process, which helps to account for the relatively higher job
satisfaction ratings these respondents provide in surveys when compared
with the responses of national deputies (e.g. Lo´pez Nieto 2000: 14–18).21
This logic is consistent with the data that highlight two types of career
trajectories: public servants versus political servants. The subnational cohort
is more likely to be composed of public servants, given that service to the
party is more important than service to the public in elected and appointed
office in determining longevity in the Congreso. This point also provides a
partial explanation for the topping-off tendency, at least for the subnational
cohort. Politicians dedicated to public service rather than party service are
less likely to be satisfied with their experiences in the party-dominated
legislative process. This point, however, requires further confirmation
through data on subnational politicians in general, their links to subnational
party offices, and their profile as public versus political servants.
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The results regarding longevity parallel the results for parliamentary
leadership as shown in Table 4. We estimated the leadership of deputies
using a binomial logistic regression analysis including the same independent
variables plus an interval variable for number of terms served. Service to the
national party and legislative terms served appear as the most robust
predictors of parliamentary leadership. In this and multiple models,
previous subnational experience measured as a dummy or by number of
years served was insignificant. Unlike the estimations for legislative
longevity, local party affiliation and the holding of partisan office were
wholly unimportant factors in determining leadership. The model predicted
correctly at an 81.2 per cent level.22 The results underscore the role of service
to the national party.
Since one or the other state-wide parties controlled the Congreso, party
affiliation may have an independent effect on leadership selection. Model
two utilises dummies for each of the state-wide parties and a dummy for
affiliation to a nationalist party. The only noteworthy result is that the
Socialists would be less likely to become leaders. This finding may reflect the
tendency of the PSOE, more than the PP or the nationalist parties, to
TABLE 4
ESTIMATE OF PARLIAMENTARY LEADERSHIP IN THE CONGRESO, LC–VII
Explanatory variable Model I Model II
Constant 72.888** 72.712**
(.164) (.180)
Regional experience 7.067
(.228)
Years in regional office .005
(.027)
Executive position in regional party .009
(.242)
Years in service to local party 7.013
(.016)
Executive position in national party .713** .642**
(.155) (.150)
Prior position in state bureaucracy .105 .163
(.194) (.190)
Legislative terms served .536** .553**
(.056) (.051)
PP 7.284
(.199)
PSOE 7.538*
(.203)
Nationalist Party .128
(.260)
Log-likelihood 1207.1 1312.8
% Predicted 81.2 81.3
Nagelkerke R2 .201 .205
N 1450 1597
All unstandardised coefficients in bold are significant: **p5 .001; *p5 .01.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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concentrate leadership posts in a small (initially quite young) group at the
national level during their 13 years in power. Nevertheless, particular
affiliations and the holding of national appointments are not strong
predictors of parliamentary leadership. Parliamentary leaders are those
deputies most likely to serve the offices of the national party and have the
benefit of experience in more than the average number of terms served in the
legislature. Given that national party position was a strong predictor of
longevity in the linear models, it is service to the national party that matters
most in determining the success of deputies. Regional experience may even
be a hindrance to ambitious deputies, as the linear models suggest.
The findings show that decentralisation did not produce systemic
influence in parliament for politicians with subnational experience, but it
does not exclude the existence of individuals from particular subnational
regions and electoral districts that may exercise extraordinary influence on
behalf of their regions. I argued above that the state-wide parties have a
sense of which seats are most vulnerable to being lost to the rival party. It
could be argued that the incumbent’s party would prefer to place on these
lists politicians that are familiar with these particular districts. To allow
these politicians to serve as long as possible they should receive leadership
spots and guaranteed upper-level placement on electoral lists over time.
Using Capo-Giol’s (2000) list of preferred districts we created an even four-
fold hierarchy of 13 districts per tier. We focused our analysis on the final
three legislatures to maximise the population of deputies with subnational
experience. Table 5 reports the results. The figures indicate that incumbent
parties in high priority districts place their most experienced deputies in
these seats and these deputies also tend to be in leadership positions.
However, subnational experience does not appear to be valued as much by
incumbent parties. The lowest percentage for the indexed tiers of deputies
with subnational experience is the highest priority category. While more
than half of the entire cohort from the three latter legislatures tended to
have subnational experience, these deputies did not tend to cluster in the
high priority districts any more than those deputies without subnational
experience. The same is true of the cohort of legislative leaders. The data do
TABLE 5
ELECTORAL DISTRICT PRIORITIES FOR PP AND PSOE AND DEPUTY
LONGEVITY AND LEADERSHIP, LEGISLATURES V–VII
District
index
No. of
deputies
Cumulative
legislative
terms
No. of
leaders
Subnational cohort
No. with
experience Deputies (%) Leaders (%)
Tier 1 241 639 57 120 50 42
Tier 2 151 371 26 94 62 62
Tier 3 167 364 31 102 61 65
Tier 4 90 205 14 56 62 29
Total 649 1579 128 372
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not indicate any advantage to subnational experience in the placement of
leaders with such backgrounds in high priority districts.
Conclusions
This study found little evidence that decentralisation expanded the influence
of subnational representatives within the party system or the parliament of
democratic Spain. This was true despite the growing cohort of deputies with
subnational experience in the Congreso, the ability of subnational party
offices to recruit and place candidates on electoral lists, and the increasing
importance of regional issues in national elections.
The data are also helpful for understanding the general trends in career
trajectories in Spain. Legislative careers in the Congreso are short overall
with few notable differences among parties. Why this is the case has much to
do with the vacuity of parliamentary life for non-leaders. Yet this study also
suggests that while parliamentary careers tend to be short, political careers
are not. Politicians with extensive subnational experience do go to the
Congreso, but they finish their careers there and only rarely return to
subnational office subsequently. The prevalence of topping-off limits the
benefits accrued from the circulation of elites from the Congreso to other
institutions, including those at the subnational level. When this is considered
alongside our finding that subnational experience is a poor predictor of
legislative leadership and longevity, it becomes clear that regional
representation is weak in the Congreso.
Another outcome of the study that has implications for understanding
intergovernmental relations in multi-tiered states with disciplined parties
and closed parliamentary processes is that subnational ‘representatives’ are
more likely to stay in the domain of regional and municipal politics.
Comparisons of the findings of this study with others on the career
trajectories of regional politicians suggest that the national and subnational
political classes in Spain may be very different. Where this study shows only
a weak cohort of subnational representation in the Congreso, studies of the
regional parliaments demonstrate that two-thirds of their composition is
made up of politicians with experience and actual responsibilities in local
and other regional positions (Lo´pez Nieto et al. 2003; Morata 1992). The
other third may be composed of individuals who try a period of public
service at relatively low cost and then return to private life (Geser 1999:
6–7). Representation of place thus appears as a more important aspect of
the regional parliaments than it does of the national one.
One matter for further research is the issue of the subnational cohort’s
motivations and actions while in the Congreso. This is a notoriously under-
studied question in Spain and in comparative perspective (Delgado 2000;
Putnam 1973). Lo´pez Nieto (2000: 21) detected a bifurcation of her
respondents into individualistic deputies and party-oriented ones. This is
similar to the present finding that there may be a political servant/public
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servant distinction in the Spanish political class. Yet she attempts to go
further than the present study by asking ‘supply-side’ questions concerning
what motivates public servants (Norris 1997b: 224–9). Most relevant to our
interests on the effects of decentralisation, one might ask whether members
of the subnational cohort behave in the Congreso in ways that identify them
with the functions of ‘subnational representatives’, despite their limited
influence. As scholars learn more about political careers in the Congreso,
motivations will become a more salient focus of study.
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Notes
1. For a useful review of these trends, see Brzinski et al. (1999), Keating (1998), Downs (1998)
and Van Houten (2003).
2. This assumption is consistent with how parliaments in established democracies have
become more diverse due to the growing diversity of the class, gender, and education
backgrounds of their parliamentarians (Norris 1997a: 6–7).
3. Following the 1982 general elections, this party eroded and its deputies mostly went to the
Alianza Popular, the predecessor of the centre-right PP.
4. The first two legislatures, the Constituent Assembly and the first congress, were also
minoritarian. UCD relied on alliances with nationalists and centrists.
5. The term ‘cleavage’ here does not refer to the conventional definition of societal groups
forming the basis for mass parties. It refers instead to territorially-defined interests that
include political elites and private actors and that are most represented by regional
government.
6. The present study finds that leadership experience in the congress and number of terms
served are positively correlated (.364, p5 .001).
7. Research I have conducted and which is presented elsewhere demonstrates that dis-
tributional conflicts in the intergovernmental arena between the national government and
regional governments explains the timing and degree of decentralisation over time. See
Montero (2005).
8. Independent deputies are particularly weak since all unaffiliated representatives are lumped
into the Grupo Mixto (Mixed Group – GM), a heterogenous group that finds it difficult to
act as a single entity, as legislative institutions require any parliamentary group to have
influence over the Congreso.
9. One obvious explanation for this is that working for the national party requires physical
displacement to Madrid, making subnational public service less viable. This correlation
may be weaker for the nationalist parties whose base is in the regional capitals, but it may
exist nonetheless for nationalist municipal politicians whose service places them outside the
regional capitals.
10. This observation is based on a series of interviews of organisational and general secretaries
of the major parties and the nationalist parties, conducted by the author in seven Spanish
regions during 2002–03 (see Montero 2005). The regions covered by this study were
Andalusia, Asturias, the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, Madrid and Valencia.
11. This can include asking questions intended to reflect an agenda item of importance in
regional politics or a particular perspective on an agenda item. I am now conducting a study
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of questions asked by deputies in the committees of the sixth and seventh legislatures to
categorise such interventions, assess their frequency, and determine if career trajectory
profiles explain them.
12. The formula and logic for Capo Giol’s (2000) listing cannot be explained fully here. Its
structure is based on the percentage of the vote swing in a given electoral district for the
election of a single deputy by the largest rival to the incumbent’s party. The author uses
data from the general elections of 1993 and 1996 to compose two lists.
13. The author gathered this biographical data from the archives of the Congreso and a recent
comprehensive ‘who’s who’-type study of all deputies in the Spanish democratic period
(Mene´ndez et al. 2002). Data for each legislature includes all deputies who served,
regardless of whether they served complete terms or not. The years of the legislatures are:
LC 1977–79; I 1979–82; II 1982–86; III 1986–89; IV 1989–93; V 1993–96; VI 1996–2000; VII
2000–04.
14. Scholars of political careers most often argue that support for the incompatibility law is
based on a pervasive cultural aversion to ‘accumulating political offices’ (acumulacio´n
de cargos). See Baena de Alca´zar (1999), Lo´pez Nieto (2000: 15), and Martı´nez and
Me´ndez (2000: 255). For a history of incompatibility norms and laws in Spain, see Garcı´a
(1994).
15. I use the term ‘chancellor’ to refer to the appointed heads of subnational policy secretariats
or chancelleries.
16. The ten point overlap in the numbers is for deputies who held both appointed and elected
office.
17. The average is higher for the last four legislatures (13.3) but notably inconsistent across
these sessions (IV 11.9; V 14.5; VI 13.2; VII 13.7).
18. Concerning the survey data in support of the greater attractiveness of mayoralties and the
low turnover in municipal politics in comparison to the national congress, see Lo´pez Nieto
(2000: 14–15).
19. These individuals are designated by their parties, usually those in the majority, to shape
legislation in committee before taking draft law reports to plenary sessions. The ponente is
the single most important figure on a committee.
20. Pearson tests confirmed that there was little possibility of multicollinearity among the
partisan variables and the legislative longevity and leadership dependent variables. All
independent variables in the model had acceptable tolerance values.
21. This is particularly true of mayors, most of whom enjoy absolute majorities on their
respective municipal councils.
22. In order to test the strength of the national party service variable, we ran a model that
excluded legislative experience. National party service predicted parliamentary leadership
even more robustly (1.170, p5 .001) and state office remained insignificant. The goodness
of fit, however, was inferior to model 2.
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